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"There's some cool sword-fighting. But still, it's junk." 
– Stephen Hunter, Washington Post  
 
"I was crying a lot throughout the movie. That was not a 
surface feeling, but rather a deep-seated feeling that came from 
me as a Japanese." 
– skaskaclub88, Yahoo!Japan reviewer 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Hollywood, struck by a case of Japan "fever" in the early 21st century, churned 
out a crop of Japan-oriented films such as Lost in Translation [Coppola 2003], 
Kill Bill Vol. 2 [Tarantino 2004], Memoirs of a Geisha [Marshall 2005] and 
Letters from Iwo Jima [Eastwood 2006]. But among all these, The Last Samurai 
[Zwick 2003] received the most positive Japanese audience reaction. This film, 
about an ex-Civil War American soldier who takes up arms to fight with the last 
of the samurai, played to mixed reviews in the U.S. but enjoyed a wildly popular 
reception in Japan.  Judging from Japanese online discussion posts and media 
articles, many Japanese audiences read the film differently from the American 
critics. Why and what do these reviews tell us about Japan in the beginning of the 
21st century? By being a foreign film, The Last Samurai allowed Japanese 
audiences to celebrate the nationalist messages taboo in a domestically produced 
film. 
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CRITICAL REACTION TO THE LAST SAMURAI 
 
This paper will make use of print reviews along with extensive use of online 
discussion board postings to gauge the Japanese audience reactions to The 
Last Samurai. These reactions, posted on the Yahoo!Japan discussion board 
for movie reviews, were saved by the author back in 2004 on the hunch that 
they would be useful as future primary source materials. These posts will be 
used to bolster the argument that Japanese audiences accepted the film 
differently than American audiences. In the past, only respected reviewers 
and critics would be taken seriously as sources, but a growing body of 
scholars believes that online fan-generated sources such as blogs and 
bulletin boards are also indicative of the ranges of popular opinion. 
Examples can be seen in Kathleen Boler's study of discussion forums for 
The Daily Show (Boler 2008), or in Into the Blogosphere, an online 
collection of articles dealing with the use of blogs (Gurak et al. 2004).  
On the surface, The Last Samurai seemed an unlikely candidate to 
win over Japanese audiences. The director, Edwin Zwick took liberties with 
historical facts, even by Hollywood standards. This film was remotely based 
on the real life of Saigō Takamori who had led a samurai rebellion against 
the nascent Meiji government in 1877. Nathan Algren, played by Tom 
Cruise, was a former U.S. soldier sent to Japan to train a modern army. 
Algren is captured by samurai rebels and brought to a remote samurai 
village where he finds out that Katsumoto, the rebel samurai leader played 
by Watanabe Ken, is leading a rebellion against corrupt Japanese officials. 
Through his captivity, Algren gains a deep appreciation of the samurai 
lifestyle and decides to join Katsumoto to fight a valiant but doomed battle 
against the modern Japanese army. To even a casual student of Japanese 
history, this movie employed fictional characters, events and fictional wars 
that would seem to make this movie implausible.  
American critical reaction to The Last Samurai was mixed. Some 
reviewers saw a flawed movie with good intentions; for example, Richard 
Schickel of Time praised the movie's romanticised theme of samurai 
fighting to protect their pre-modern values. Other critics saw the movie as a 
part of a "white male saves a non-white world" genre, as seen in Dances 
with Wolves [Costner 1990], in which Kevin Costner stars as a white 
American soldier who takes up residence with Native Americans and 
defends them from the American army. Stephen Hunter, in a scathing 
review in the Washington Post, pointed out that The Last Samurai was just 
Dances with Wolves set in late 19th century Japan with samurai playing the 
role of Native Americans (Hunter 2003). For many American critics, the 
movie's analogy of the samurai with the Native Americans seemed too 
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forced and sentimental. If American critics like Hunter did not like this 
flawed analogy, then how would Japanese audiences and critics react to this 
film? 
In contrast, the reaction to the film within Japan was mostly positive. 
There, The Last Samurai opened on 6 December 2003 and was met with 
high box-office returns and favourable reviews. For example, the film 
grossed USD111,127,263 in the American market (24.3% of its total 
revenue), and was ranked 20th in the U.S. box-office movies list. In Japan, 
the movie grossed USD119,268,595, which surpassed the U.S. figures. This 
movie was the second most popular movie in Japan in 2003, based on box 
office sales.1 Critics of the film magazine Kinema Junpō listed The Last 
Samurai as the fifth best foreign film of 2003, while their readers voted it 
the second best foreign film of the year, beating out blockbusters such as 
Chicago [Marshall 2002] and Lord of the Rings: The Two Towers [Jackson 
2002] (Kinema Junpō 2004).  
While The Last Samurai elicited a variety of critical and popular 
responses from admiration to simple indifference, one of the most common 
reactions of both critics and popular reviewers was one of tears. For 
example, Ochi Michiō, writing in the film magazine Kinema Junpō, seemed 
profoundly moved: "What's surprising about this movie is how even one 
week after watching a preview screening, scenes from the movie keep 
playing in my mind and continue to be alive. Moreover, my tears start to 
pour out when I think of them" (Ochi 2003: 35). In addition, many 
Japanese-language members posted similar reactions on the Yahoo!Japan 
discussion board. A user, Joker6818 noted that he could not stop crying 
during the last hour of the movie. Another reviewer, nf7to0268 noted that 
the audience could not move after the film was over because they were too 
emotionally drained from crying.  
The Last Samurai elicited strong emotions from Japanese audience 
despite its historical errors and latent ideology of American supremacy 
because this film spoke to Japanese undergoing economic and social 
change. The following pages will show how Japanese reinterpreted The Last 
Samurai into a nationalist ode to Japanese values. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
  All office figures were gathered from www.boxofficemojo.com 
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THE LAST SAMURAI AS AN ALLEGORY ABOUT AMERICAN 
INFLUENCE 
 
The Last Samurai tapped into the growing anti-American sentiment 
exacerbated by what many Japanese considered to be American bullying. 
Japanese audiences identified this as an "American" film and therefore 
feelings about the U.S. came to the surface in their reviews. But it would be 
a mistake to see this film as simply a product of "Hollywood" as The Last 
Samurai was a multi-national collaboration, shot at various locations 
throughout the world, and featured a multinational cast: American actors 
like Tom Cruise and Londoner Timothy Spall alongside Japanese celebrities 
such as martial arts superstar Sanada Hiroyuki.  
Despite the multinational nature of this film production, Japanese 
audiences identified the themes of The Last Samurai with the United States. 
This anti-Americanism in Japan revealed the Japanese audience's 
ambivalent relationship with the U.S., which was comprised of a mixture of 
fear and longing. As Yoshimi Shunya points out, after the war, the U.S. was 
considered an overwhelming figure of authority, especially with the large 
number of bases and soldiers on Japanese soil. But with the passage of time 
and decrease in the numbers of American troops, "America-the-occupier" 
ceased to be part of most people's everyday experience, and so the image of 
America became sanitised through television. Consequently, the Japanese 
view of America became less direct, and more mediated and confined to 
images (Shunya 2003: 443–444). 
Watanabe Yasushi, in his article on anti-Americanism in Japan, noted 
that by the mid 1990s to early 2000s, the U.S. was perceived to be a bully 
that expanded its power through money, mass media and military power 
(2008: 7–10). The American invasion of Iraq and subsequent demand that 
the Japanese government send military forces as a show of support angered 
many Japanese, who found this dispatch of Japanese Self Defense forces to 
be a direct violation of their constitution's Article 9, which renounced 
military force as an instrument of foreign policy. It is in this context of a 
perceived American bullying over Iraq, that Japanese audiences flocked to 
the Last Samurai to enjoy what they considered its anti-American message. 
As one post, under the name saka_kun_jr suggested, this was a Hollywood 
movie aimed at Americans, and so Japan in this movie represented Iraq or 
other developing nations. According to this post, the film cautioned against 
America intervening in other nations' affairs. Other viewers also interpreted 
the movie as a denunciation of the invasion of Iraq. For example, a reviewer 
in the Asahi Shimbun also noted the parallels between the samurai rebels 
and Iraq insurgents, seeing the rebel leader Katsumoto as someone who 
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threw away the lives of his men in a reckless suicide attacks while fighting 
fellow Japanese (Wakamiya 17). Thus, The Last Samurai could be read as a 
criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq. In his mind, both film samurai and Iraq 
insurgents were using the same tactics and fighting for the same anti-
Western causes.  
 
 
A NATIONALIST MOVIE MADE BY FOREIGNERS 
 
The positive reception to The Last Samurai was also a product of the rise in 
Japanese popular nationalism. In the decade prior to the film's release, 
voices in the popular media began to question the notion of Japan's Pacific 
War (as WWII is commonly called) as a war of aggression. For example, 
the comics of Kobayashi Yoshinori, who publicly defended the war as a just 
war, became popular among some Japanese readers (Sakamoto 2008). This 
nationalistic movement had also grown within Japanese academia. 
Conservative historians, led by historian Kanji Nishiō of the Japanese 
Society for History Textbook Reform, promoted a new history textbook that 
critics accused of whitewashing Japan's wartime atrocities but supporters 
said was needed to make young Japanese proud of their nation (Masalski 
2003).  Even though the vast majority of Japanese schools did not adopt 
textbook, South Korean and Chinese governments lodged strong protests 
and citizens took to the streets in an anti-Japanese frenzy. To many 
Japanese, it seemed that Japan would always be the villain of Asia. 
Therefore, many audience members watched the Last Samurai as a foreign 
movie that reminded them that not all people outside Japan saw their past in 
a negative light.  
Many Japanese feel certain ambivalence to being identified as a 
nationalist out of fear of being associated with organised crime and 
gangsters. Viewers of the Last Samurai, however, could express these 
nationalistic sentiments because this was a foreign-made movie identified as 
an American production. As Motoko Rich (2004) points out in a New York 
Times article, 
 
Counterintuitively, Mr. Zwick's lack of native 
familiarity with Japanese culture might have 
helped the film's reception in that country. "What 
if a Japanese contemporary director had made it?" 
wrote Midori Nakano in The Sunday Mainichi, a 
weekly magazine. "Right away, people would start 
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to question the director's political intention and 
ideological stance" (11 par). 
 
For many Japanese, right-wing nationalism is associated with uyoku, ultra-
nationalists (with underworld connections) who ride about in large sound 
trucks blaring loud patriotic music in an attempt to intimidate people. Yet, 
this movie could express nationalist sentiments that reconfirmed for some 
Japanese a sense of their national pride. For example, on the Yahoo!movies 
bulletin board, a reviewer named kouyudamashi, described his renewed 
pride in being Japanese: "Yes, I can say I feel more proud of being Japanese 
than ever [....]. There are still the strong feelings such as honour, pride and a 
lot of respect in my head." So for some Japanese, The Last Samurai made 
them proud to be Japanese again. 
But why had some Japanese eagerly taken to this portrayal of their 
values in an overseas Hollywood movie? One could argue that a long 
process of over-internationalisation had increasingly blurred the boundaries 
of Japanese identity. The Japanese people, like most of Asia, had always 
grappled with dealing with outside influences, especially in the 20th 
century. But alongside this growing internationalisation was a crosscurrent 
of nationalism, against which some Japanese asked questions such as who 
they were, or how they could return to their national roots. The Last 
Samurai can only be understood within the context of 21st century 
globalisation. For many Japanese, this movie reaffirmed that they had lost 
their core beliefs in the face of what they perceived as relentless 
Americanisation.  For example, a 22 year old Yahoo!Japan bulletin board 
poster named jami_nyon wrote she felt ashamed that it took a foreign movie 
to reconfirm how one should not forget the good parts of Japan. 
Also, one could say that to have a megastar like Tom Cruise speak 
Japanese and profess his love of Japan and finding peace through Japanese 
values was affirming to the viewer's national esteem. The Last Samurai 
would thus imply that Western influences were corrupting, while the old 
Japanese values, as learned by Tom Cruise's character, were pure. And 
symbolically, in the hearts of Japanese viewers, Tom Cruise became 
Japanese through his emotionally compelling performance. As Tamba 
Kiyoko, a 54-year-old housewife noted in the print magazine Kinema 
Junpō, "Set against the eloquence of Watanabe Ken, is Cruise's silence. 
[….] His Japanism (jyapanizumu)—Japanese-style expression, and being 
completely at ease in Japanese clothes and armor—tickles the hearts of 
Japanese" (Tamba). Whether or not lack of speaking is a Japanese method 
of acting is beside the point. The key point is that Cruise was domesticated 
into a Japanese actor in the eyes of this viewer. And with Japanese actors 
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sharing the screen with Cruise, The Last Samurai contained a message that 
Japanese still had a place in this globalised world culture and not only could 
they compete with the world's best, but also the world's best could become 
part of Japan. Indeed, the movie's Japanese advertising campaign reinforced 
this message. While the American posters featured a Tom Cruise in samurai 
battle armour, the Japanese posters featured an armoured Tom Cruise 
standing next to the Japanese actors Watanabe Ken, Hiroyuki Sanada and 
Koyuki. 
 
 
THE LAST SAMURAI AND NATIONAL PRIDE THROUGH AN 
IMAGINED PAST 
 
As a film about honour and identity in the face of wrenching social and 
economic change, The Last Samurai spoke to Japanese viewers who were 
experiencing uncertainties about their own economic system. The 21st 
century opened in Japan with the faltering of the economic system that had 
long churned out high-speed growth in post-war Japan. This system, based 
on pork barrel spending on infrastructure and those industries favoured by 
the government, helped to fund Japan's spectacular economic growth and 
most importantly, guarantee lifetime employment for elite college 
graduates. Thus, companies could run deficits, knowing that government 
money would prop them up during bad times. Although Japan's vaunted 
lifetime employment system only extended to about a third of the male 
workforce, this system remained the workforce ideal for workers and the 
gap in incomes between rich and poor seemed less than those in other 
industrialised countries. 
However, rampant financial speculation and corruption led to the 
collapse of this system by the 1990s. Japan went into the "Lost Decade" in 
which the nation's economic growth stagnated and the government seemed 
unable to muster the will to enact substantial measures to reform the 
economy. New reforms intended to end the recession also led to growing 
economic inequality as the government stopped shoveling capital to money-
losing companies and forced them to make painful restructuring cuts. A 
degree from a good college was no longer a guarantee of economic security, 
as the media told stories of college graduates who could only find part time 
jobs or temporary work with no job security. To Japan's younger generation, 
this seemed a cruel joke: They had honored their end of bargain by studying 
hard and doing well in school, but suddenly, with the rules now changed, 
they found that they could be fired at any time.  
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By the 21st century, Japan was still a wealthy country but faced an 
unknown future. Many equated this predicament with ruthless 
Americanisation—what they perceived to be a cutthroat economy 
accompanied by a growing wage gap. The media picked up on the theme of 
kakusa shakai (a society of disparity) as the gap between rich and poor and 
white-collar versus blue-collar increased. In this economic context, The Last 
Samurai offered viewers nostalgia for the past, which was seen as one of 
comfort and stability. Japanese viewers were attracted to this film's idealised 
version of the Samurai because in this time of economic change, Japanese 
looked to these warriors as the embodiment of so-called traditional values. 
In fact, the Japanese online reviewers surprisingly embraced this idealised 
image of the samurai because it touched in them stirrings of national pride. 
One review posted on Yahoo!Japan's bulletin board: 
 
 "Japanese should have a steadfast belief in being a 
little more proud to be Japanese. After seeing this 
movie, I felt that something stirred within me. I 
want to be a spiritually and physically strong man 
like the samurai. I will want to aim at that being 
strong in both the pen and the sword, living a 
simple but sturdy life, and to purify myself every 
day." (real_gentleman_in_Tokyo) 
 
Like the post above, many Japanese viewers felt national pride through 
viewing the idealised Samurai heritage featured in The Last Samurai. The 
problem was that they were also parroting a modern 20th century 
interpretation of Bushidō, the supposed way of the samurai warrior.  
According to historian Karl Friday (2007), Japanese scarcely used the term 
"Bushidō" until the modern period, and there was little written discussion in 
pre-modern Japanese times as to what constituted the way of the warrior (2 
par). In fact, the modern concept of Bushidō could be viewed as somewhat 
of an anachronism, popularised in 1898 by Nitobe Inazo in Bushidō: The 
Soul of Japan and originally published in English to explain Japanese values 
to a Western audience. Inazo, a pacifist Quaker, did not write Bushidō to 
promote militarism. According to Minato Akiko (2003), Nitobe was 
proposing a set of values to guide the human heart (26 par). 
Ironically, Nitobe, a pacifist, helped to re-popularise the idea of 
Bushidō as a moral foundation for Japanese, and this warrior code was 
propagated by the government through education, and by the mass media 
through movies and books as a national myth—to teach commoners the 
supposed militaristic values of the samurai. The idea of Bushidō, and its 
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reinterpretation (to fight to the death, which samurai did not do in the 
warrior days), became the basis for countless movies, and for the 
government's militaristic wartime propaganda justifying blind obedience to 
the emperor and suicides rather than surrender. After the war, Occupation 
authorities removed references to militarism in education, and even inserted 
Article 9 into the new Japanese constitution, which renounced war as an 
instrument of national policy. A growing number of Japanese, reacting to 
their experience of war, also helped to lead a pacifist movement that made 
publicly distasteful, any overt expression of the militaristic interpretation of 
Bushidō and ultra-nationalism. As we shall see in a subsequent section of 
this paper, the romanticisation of Bushidō continued on in samurai movies, 
and later in the 1960s onward, on television samurai period dramas 
(jidaigeki).  
Of course, there were viewers who could not understand why so 
many people were proud to be Japanese after watching The Last Samurai. 
For example, one Yahoo!Japan poster, ykr617 noted the WWII-era 
militaristic themes in this film:  
 
"One cannot help but feel that the producers 
exploited the samurai spirit of Japan in order to 
affirm modern America's national policy. I want 
you to remember this. Until we lost World War II, 
about half of Japan truly believed that 'I will die 
for the sake of the emperor.' That is, for Japanese, 
a sad past that should make us feel ashamed" 
(ykr617). 
 
This viewer understood the historical dangers of the movie's message, 
pointing out that slavish obedience to the emperor had led the Japanese 
government and people to a destructive war. She realised that the movie 
promoted militarism by romanticising blind obedience to the Emperor.  
Yet, such opinions comprised the minority in Japanese audience 
reaction. For most viewers, the Last Samurai hit a nationalistic nerve, and it 
reawakened in many a pride in being Japanese.  Many of the internet posters 
who liked this film were in their thirties, a part of the generation who grew 
up in a Japan noted for its prosperity and pacifism, in direct contrast to the 
economic, social and political struggles of their wartime and postwar 
recovery generation. As such, the viewers may have interpreted the movie 
as a self-critical condemnation of materialistic Japanese society that had 
forgotten its roots. For example, in a revealing quote, erino1212 wrote: 
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"When I returned to my home, there were western 
curtains, a Western-style living room, and while on 
my western bed I felt that something was out of 
place. I want to find my inner essence and live that 
way. It was really good that I saw this movie" 
(erino1212). 
 
Yet, this is strange, as Japan had started its Westernisation program back in 
the late 19th century. As such, this viewer was not part of a wrenching 
transition from Japanese-style to western-style homes nor was he part of the 
change from pre-modern lifestyles to a modern one. This reaction shows 
that films are about the time period in which they are produced and not 
about the time period in which they are set. The viewer was not thinking of 
the 19th century changes or wanting to go back to the samurai era when he 
wrote about feeling out of place while lying on a western style bed (which 
many Japanese, by the early 21st century, had slept in since childhood). This 
viewer was rather discussing the sense of unease he felt at the economic and 
social changes Japanese society faced at the beginning of the new 
millennium. 
Therefore, The Last Samurai provided a message to Japanese viewers 
fearful of a social or economic breakdown. The imagined pre-modern Japan 
in this instance represented honour, loyalty, community, simplicity and 
bravery through an idealised representation of the samurai. Japanese 
audiences readily interpreted this flattering portrayal of Japan into one that 
offered them reassurance in an era of wrenching economic change. This 
Hollywood film offered what Edward Said (1978) would probably call 
"orientalist" representations of a romanticised and idealised samurai society, 
but one fundamentally different from Western "modernity" and doomed to 
die in the name of "progress." Ironically, this film's portrayal of samurai 
allowed Japanese to mourn what they felt they had lost in the lost decade of 
the 1990s. Japanese audiences took to this film's mythical Japanese past 
because they believed it portrayed what the Japanese had lost in the 
transition to a new economy which cast aside unwanted employees.  
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THE LAST SAMURAI AS AMERICAN JIDAIGEKI (PERIOD 
DRAMA) 
 
Another reason for the Japanese reaction to this film was that these 
audiences watched The Last Samurai in the context of watching a jidaigeki 
("period drama") or samurai genre drama with established conventions and 
motifs. According to Mark Schilling, these period dramas "are to Japan 
what the Western is to the United States: Repositories of national myths and 
cultural values" (1997: 135–138). Today, these dramas are seemed as old-
fashioned, and may even hearken back to the nationalistic values of the 
wartime, which may turn off some audiences. Yet, by being a foreign-made 
film, Japanese could indulge themselves in the jidaigeki themes seen in The 
Last Samurai. 
One of the final scenes showed how some Japanese audiences 
interpreted this film as an American-made jidaigeki. After the climactic 
battle, Algren barges in on a meeting where the young emperor is about to 
sign a treaty forced upon him by the Americans and greedy advisors. 
Hoping to stop this treaty, Algren prostrates himself before the Emperor. 
When the corrupt officials question his loyalty, Algren responds in true 
samurai fashion by offering to take his own life should the emperor doubt 
his loyalty. The Emperor, touched by this devotion, then gives a speech in 
English: "I have dreamed of a unified Japan, of a country strong and 
independent and modern. And now we have railroads and cannon, western 
clothing. But, we cannot forget who we are or where we come from." Then, 
the newly inspired Emperor Meiji, remembering his duties to his ancestors, 
refuses to sign the arms treaty, dismisses the Americans, and confiscates the 
properties of his corrupt government advisor. In other words, the young 
Emperor begins to rule Japan the way he wants to (and should) rule. 
Non-Japanese critics found this last scene to be out of place and 
altered the tone of The Last Samurai. Roger Ebert, for instance, viewed it as 
a Hollywood style ending that "caves in to Hollywood requirements, and we 
feel the air going out of the picture" (2003). Yet, while many American 
reviewers thought the ending as cheap and contrived, Yoel Sano of Asia 
Times Online, commented on how the Emperor's speech spoke to Japanese 
contemporary audiences facing economic change. When speaking of Japan's 
acceptance of modern phenomena such as railways, the Emperor reminds 
audiences that "...the Japanese cannot forget where they came from. This is 
certainly true of Japan in 2003, where much of the struggle between the 
would-be reformers and the old guard may in fact reflect a deeper battle for 
Japan's soul and identity, rather than being based solely on economic 
structures and deregulation" (Sano 2003). 
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For Japanese audiences, this powerful scene hit a nerve and spoke to 
the contemporary struggle to assert Japan's domestic identity. A Yahoo 
poster named best_fregrance, self-identified as a 25-year-old male from 
Tokyo summarised this sentiment in his post under the heading "It's for 
today's spineless Japanese":  
 
"I think that one should not forget the words of the 
Meiji Emperor in the end of the movie. Those 
words are the true meaning of the film [....]. 
Today, Japan is rampant with people who really 
lack morals, and this kind of movie is a good 
medicine for them" (best_fregrance). 
 
This viewer found the Emperor's words to be something that all Japanese 
needed to take to heart. Yet, this was a strange final scene because most 
Japanese who know even a smattering of their history would have known 
the Meiji Emperor was a figurehead ruler and so this scene was at odds with 
what they learned in history classes. So why did many Japanese viewers 
find this scene to be the emotional climax in the film?  
Rather than assuming that The Last Samurai led to the surfacing of a 
latent respect towards the Emperor, one needs to situate the content of the 
scene within the tradition of Japanese long-running television jidaigeki 
samurai shows like Mitō Kōmon [1969–present], Toyama no Kinsan [1970–
1996] or Abarenbō Shōgun [1978–2008]. These shows typically present a 
high official (former vice-shogun Tokugawa Mitsukuni in Mitō Kōmon) 
living in disguise among the common people. By the end of each hour-long 
weekly episode, the official uncovers wrongdoing by high officials and 
reveals their true identity. In a moment of emotional climax, he pronounces 
a singular judgment that simultaneously protects the weak citizens in Japan 
and punishes the corrupt officials. For example, in Mitō Kōmon, the climax 
of each episode was when at the critical moment, Mitō's retainer would 
reveal Mitō Kōmon's official seal, causing the villains to prostrate 
themselves to the ground and receive legal punishment (Schilling 1997: 
135–138). The final scene with the Emperor pronouncing judgment on the 
evil villains bore much similarity with the these jidaigeki television dramas.  
At its core, The Last Samurai was an old period drama dressed up in 
Hollywood clothing. Motoko Rich (2004), of the New York Times, noted the 
incongruity of seeing these images, popularised by Japanese literature and 
film, return to the screen in "new American packaging" (9 par). Indeed, 
Zwick was recycling old Japanese themes of duty and loyalty, which had 
fallen out of favor in Japan during the peace and prosperity of the 1980s. He 
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had read stories of the samurai, such as Ivan Morris' The Nobility of Failure 
(1975) and had watched many old samurai dramas in preparation for this 
movie; however, ironically, it was the foreignness of the director which 
allowed Japanese audiences to react positively to the movie as Rich 
suggests:  
 
Counterintuitively, Mr. Zwick's lack of native 
familiarity with Japanese culture might have 
helped the film's reception in that country. ''What if 
a Japanese contemporary director had made it?'' 
wrote Midori Nakano in The Sunday Mainichi, a 
weekly magazine. ''Right away, people would start 
to question the director's political intention and 
ideological stance." (Rich 11 par). 
 
Indeed, while many American reviewers saw the film as a Western similar 
to Dances with Wolves, Japanese saw this as a jidaigeki period piece (also 
known as "chambara" or sword fighting movies), more in the vein of Akira 
Kurosawa's Seven Samurai [1954]. Todoroki Yukio of Kinema Junpō wrote, 
"This is a jidaigeki with the whiff of a western. This script could have come 
from Akira Kurosawa and this is an ode to a genre that has long since 
disappeared." (2004: 104). Zwick, however, had resurrected this genre in the 
guise of an American movie. 
Likewise, the scene when the Meiji Emperor refuses to cooperate 
with the Americans reinforced for many viewers, the need for Japanese to 
reassert their national sovereignty. Arafuji Junko wrote of how the Meiji 
Emperor's willingness to stand up to the Americans contrasted with the 
weak Japanese politicians of today. He noted the parallels with Iraq, that 
when watching the young Meiji Emperor's refusal to buy weapons from the 
Americans, "You can't help compare him to today's Prime Minister who has 
dispatched the Self Defense Forces to please the Americans" (2004: 93). As 
such, many Japanese seemed to accept this idealised portrait of the emperor 
because it served as a critique of a perceived forced Americanisation of 
society. This movie provoked a moral judgment in the familiar genre of the 
jidaigeki, where the benevolent high official, in this case the Emperor, made 
society moral again. 
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WHO IS THE LAST SAMURAI?  
 
Differing American and Japanese reactions to The Last Samurai can be 
explained through a consideration of context. Ebert asks the all-important 
question, "Which character is the "last samurai": Katsumoto or Algren?"  
and contends that "A case can be made for either answer, which suggests the 
nature of their relationship" (18 par). Each case seems to fall across national 
lines, with American reviewers and audiences focusing on Algren and 
Japanese audiences focusing on Katsumoto. 
On the one hand, American audiences, viewing The Last Samurai 
through the Dances with Wolves paradigm, focused on Tom Cruise as the 
last samurai. Much like how Costner's character carried on Native American 
traditions, audiences and critics saw Cruise carrying on the samurai tradition 
after the rest of the samurai rebels had been slain in battle. Many Japanese 
audiences, on the other hand, focused on Watanabe as the last samurai. A 
Japanese bulletin board posting under vakara001 was perplexed that people 
outside Japan were so critical of this film.  
 
"I looked at Yahoo America, and they said that the 
'Last Samurai' was the white man Tom Cruise. But 
I wrote that it was strange for him to be the 
samurai. The 'Last Samurai' was Watanabe Ken 
right? I was shocked at the American opinion" 
(vakara001). 
 
But what if the words "last samurai" meant plural, as in the whole army of 
samurai? If so, then with his death, comes the end of an era, and the end of 
samurai values. In a way, audiences were moved to tears during 
Katsumoto's death scene because they were watching the end of an idealised 
and imagined Japanese way of life.  If Katsumoto and his fellow samurai 
were the last samurai, then their deaths represented the end of an era. The 
scene when the samurai make their final charge into modern weaponry was 
thus seen as one symbolising the close of the era where people cared about 
honor and loyalty. In this author's opinion, Japanese in the 21st century, far 
removed from the Meiji era, were also mourning the loss of their national 
identity and simpler way of life, as represented by the samurai. The death of 
the loyal, but now useless samurai, became an analogy for the loss of 
Japanese identity, the economic reforms and the end of the loyal salaryman 
worker. Algren, having received a sword from Katsumoto that read "I 
belong to the warrior in whom the old ways have joined the new," became a 
symbol of what the Japanese had to become if they were to survive in the 
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21st century—even more Americanised with a hint of Japaneseness to them. 
In the final scene, Algren, the sole survivor of the samurai, returns to the 
samurai village, but the samurai were gone.  It would seem that, for many 
Japanese viewers, the film was so moving because it hit close to home; they 
too, like Algren, were the survivors who had seen a way of life vanish. 
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